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This article discusses Canadian, U.K., U.S., French, and Swedish models
of worker ownership and the legal principles which apply to them. Based
on the evidence that, in contrast to other traditional forms of workplace
organization, worker participation in ownership and management gives
rise to greater efficiency and productivity, lower employee absentee rates,
greater job satisfaction, reduced need for managerial supervision, the
lowest cost per job created and a democratic workplace, the article argues
for comprehensive legislation to address the relevant issues surrounding
worker ownership, so that worker co-operatives and other forms of
worker ownership can reach their full potential in Canada.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article discusses various models of worker ownership law
which may be considered in drafting appropriate legislation on the
topic in Canada. If forms of worker ownership are to be
encouraged in Canada appropriate legislation is desirable. This
legislation must serve demands of democratic decision making and
economic efficiency. Also, because most worker-owned firms are
small, it must address, in an imaginative manner, the very real
difficulties faced by small business in Canada.
As a viable economic form, worker ownership holds great
promise which has yet to be tapped in Canada. Part of the problem
lies in the lack of an appropriate legislative model which could
encourage, or at least facilitate, the growth of such enterprises.
Worker-owned enterprises are of varied design. Most
examples in Canada are worker co-operatives, but there are other
models in use. Different models suit different purposes and
workers. This article will concentrate on the co-operative model,
but other important models will also be examined.
If. THE CANADIAN CO-OPERATIVE LAW STRUCTURE
AND WORK CO-OPERATIVES
In Canada, only Saskatchewan and Quebec have enacted
legislation providing a mechanism particularly for establishing worker
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co-operatives. If worker co-operation is to become a potent force
in Canada's economic mosaic, effective and appropriate provincial
statutes need to be enacted, and favourable government policies
need to be directed towards such enterprises. This paper will,
therefore, discuss the implications of different structures which have
been adopted for worker co-operatives with a view to suggesting the
ingredients of an appropriate legislative structure in Canada.
No jurisdiction in Canada has a separate act covering worker
co-operatives. Most provinces require them to be incorporated in
one of two ways. First, they can choose the province's Co-operatives
Act. These Acts are most suited to consumer and farmer co-
operatives but can, nonetheless, accommodate worker co-operatives.
Alternatively, worker co-operatives can incorporate under the
provinces' Business Corporations Act. In this case, special by-laws
would be required to define the democratic structure of the co-
operative. Neither of these two incorporation devices is optimal.
One factor may have a bearing on the decision of which route to
choose: the words "co-operative" and "co-op" cannot be included in
the name of the enterprise unless it is registered under the
appropriate Co-operatives Act. A special section on worker co-
operatives exists in the legislation of Saskatchewan and Quebec.
This is an improvement over the other provinces, but these special
sections do not go far enough in dealing specifically with the
substantive issues facing worker co-operatives.
A. Part XKIV of the Co-operatives Act of Saskatchewan
Worker co-operatives in Saskatchewan are covered by
sections 263-69 of The Co-operatives Act In all other respects they
are treated exactly as are other co-operatives. These provisions
define a worker co-operative (called an employment co-operative in
Saskatchewan) as a co-operative "... whose primary purpose is to
operate an enterprise in which its members are the workers
necessary for the operation."2 The relationship between employment
S.S. 1983, c. C-37.1.
2 biS, S. 263.
1989] 649
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
and membership is dealt with in section 265: "75% of all employees
are required to be members of the co-operative and 75% of the
employees of a subsidiary of the employment co-operative are
required to be members of the co-operative."3 To ensure that these
employee-membership ratios are not circumvented too easily, it is
provided that, unless the Registrar agrees,4 "no employment co-
operative shall subcontract out more than 50% of its work."5
A worker co-operative's by-laws are required to contain
provisions covering the "conditions of admission or suspension of its
members" as well as "a procedure for laying off members when there
is a lack of work and a procedure of recall to work."6 Worker co-
operatives will not be permitted to incorporate "where the
acquisition of goods for resale to the public is one of its principal
objects stated in its articles."7 Section 268 permits, though strangely
does not require, a worker co-operative to allocate patronage
rebates on the basis of the "labour contribution of each member."S
The last provision in the Saskatchewan Act dealing with worker co-
operatives permits worker co-operatives' boards of directors to be
comprised of a majority of workers. Again, rather strangely, it does
not require the boards to be totally comprised of worker members.9
3Ibid, s. 265(l).
4/]bid, s. 265(3).
5 bid, s. 265(2).
6 (bid, s. 266. Section 8 of the Act contains a long list of matters which must be dealt
with in the by-laws of all co-operatives. The two requirements listed in s. 266 are additional
for worker co-operatives.
7 ]bid, s. 267. It is very difficult to find a good reason why this restriction should
prevail. Proposed changes to the Act are to permit worker co-operatives to engage in retail
activities provided they do not use the words co-operative or co-op in their trading name.
The argument in support of this restriction is that it will save any possible confusion with
consumer co-operative stores. If worker co-operative retailers were required to prefix any
reference to co-operative or co-op with the word worker the same purpose would be achieved.
8 Section 268 contains the following words: "... the directors may decide to allocate the
patronage dividend by taking into account the labour contribution of each member [emphasis
added]."
9 ]bid, s. 269. Section 76 of the Act provides that if a co-operative wishes to make
employees eligible to serve on its board of directors the co-operative's by-laws must so
prescribe, and even then a maximum of one-third only of the total number of directors may
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B. Chapter V of the Quebec Cooperatives Act
The Quebec Cooperatives Act ° is of similar scope. Worker
co-operatives are referred to as workers' production co-operatives or
work co-operatives, and are defined as "enterprise[s] whose workers
are the members."' - As in Saskatchewan, worker co-operatives are
precluded from engaging in the retail trade as one of the principal
objectives.12  It is provided that the by-laws "may" establish
"conditions of admission, expulsion or suspension of members,"
require members to
submit to a period of probation and to a technical and co-operative training course,
... form a reception committee for new members or auxiliary members, ... form a
liaison committee between the members and the board of directors" and "establish
a procedure for laving off members when there is a lack of work and a procedure
of recall to work. 3
Section 225 provides that a co-operative may hold shares in a
subsidiary corporation provided the subsidiary is in the same business
as, or a related business to, the co-operative. It may also hold
shares in a corporation if such provides the co-operative's members
with the right to work in that corporation. Patronage rebates are to
be calculated on the basis of the "amount of work done by the
member" and this may be measured "by the income of the member,
the number of hours of work or any other scale determined by the
by-laws."14
These provisions deal only with a few of the structural issues
facing working co-operatives, and do not fully address the most
important ones. Further, the provisions themselves do not address
the matters to which they refer in very satisfactory or imaginative
ways. In fact, experience in other jurisdictions suggests considerable
be employees.
10 S.Q., 1982, c. 26.
11 bid, s. 222.
12 Ibid, s. 223.
13 kid, s. 224 [emphasis added].
14 Ibid, s. 226.
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scope for worker co-operatives, but in each country in which there
is a substantial worker co-operative sector there exists a separate
legislative framework designed specifically for worker co-operatives.15
1Il. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH INAPPROPRIATE CO-
OPERATIVE LEGISLATION
The split in the British co-operative movement between
consumer co-operatives and producer co-operatives (including
agricultural co-operatives and the co-operative productive societies
- the early u.K. worker co-operatives)1 6 at least gave rise to a readily
recognizable worker co-operative sector. Unfortunately, this sector
was weak from the beginning largely as a result of this severance
from a relatively strong consumer organization. In essence, co-
operative productive societies (cPss), as they were called, were left
to contend with the vagaries and pressures of the marketplace
without a larger support network to help sustain them. A similar
phenomenon does not have to occur in Canada in the late 1980s.
While the established co-operative movement referred to worker co-
operative development in very positive terms in the 1984 Report of
the National Task Force on Co-operative Development,'7 little has
been put into place. However, an Implementation Steering
Committee, recommended in the Report, has now been established.
15 See the discussion of the experiences in France, Italy, Spain, Yugoslavia, the U.K. and
the U.S. in R. Oakeshott, The Case for Worker Co-ops (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1978); G.D. Garson, ed., Worker Self-Management in Industry - The West European Experience
(New York: Praeger, 1977); I. Adizes & E.M. Borgese, Self-Management: New Dimensions
to Democracy: Alternatives for a New Society (Santa Barbara: A.B.C.-Clio Inc., 1975); C.S.
Axworthy, Worker Co-operatives in Mondragon, The UK and France [Occasional Paper]
(Saskatoon: Centre for the Study of Co-operatives, 1985); R. Gips, Structuring Employee
Owned and Democratically Controlled Businesses (Somerville, Mass.: I.C.A., 1982). See also
the Proceedings of the Colloque international des cooperatives de travailleurs pour le crdation et
le maintien de l'emploi, held at the Centre de gestion des cooperatives at the Ecole des Hautes
Etudes Commerciales, Universit6 de Montrdal, 26-30 August 1984. Cf 0. Williamson,
"Corporate Government' (1984) 93 Yale LJ. 1197.
16 See A. Bonner, British Co-operation, rev'd ed. (Manchester Co-operative Union Ltd.,
1970) at 133-36. The split took place in 1888.
1 7 A Co-operative Development Strategy for Canada (Ottawa: CUC/CCC, 1984).
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Generally, the British CPss were incorporated under the u.K.
Industrial and Provident Societies Acts,18 the legislation under which
consumer co-operatives were also registered. These statutes were
not ideal, nor could they be expected to be. The structure dictated
or permitted by these Acts contributed in a major way to the
difficulties faced by CPss. However, it is worth remembering that the
view propounded by the Webbs, and later accepted by the whole
co-operative movement, 19 that CPss were less successful and had
worse survival rates than small enterprises incorporated in a
conventional capitalist form has now been refuted.20  The Co-
operative Productive Federation (cPF) was established to act as a
federation of CPss, and it prepared model rules which members and
prospective members could use when incorporating their associations.
The Industrial and Provident Societies Acts were and are
permissive in character. They do not prohibit structures which
subsequently caused difficulties for CPSs. Newer structural
approaches to worker co-operatives stipulate that certain components
of the enterprise structure are mandatory. This is to ensure that
responses to particularly troublesome deficiencies in previous worker
co-operative structures are incorporated in the new structure,
hopefully eradicating reasons for failure and providing successful
worker co-operatives with long term potential. For example, the
Industrial and Provident Societies Acts permitted shares in the CPSs to
be held by persons who did not work in the enterprise, and by
associations such as trade unions and consumer co-operatives. At
first, outside capital was favourably received because, like all co-
operatives, the CPss were short on capital and keen to encourage as
much investment as possible. This need not have caused difficulties,
but invariably did, mainly because control was not kept distinct from
capital investment. Outside shareholders were able to exercise
ultimate management control, and in many circumstances they
18 1965, c. 12, as am.
19 See the discussion in D.C. Jones, "British Producer Co-operatives" in K. Coates, ed.,
The New Worker Co-operatives (Nottingham, U.K.: Spokesman Books, 1976) at 34-68. Sidney
and Beatrice Webb argued that worker co-operatives would inevitably degenerate into non-
participatory institutions. While the statistics indicate the CPSs survived better than small
capitalist enterprises in the same trades, it cannot be denied that many failed.
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concluded that because their investments had reached a certain
value, their best interest was served by selling their shares to a
conventional corporation. While this may have been beneficial for
outside shareholders, it was not always so for the worker members.
Clearly, the problem of outside investors cashing in their
investment would have been solved if shareholders were restricted
to the return of their investment plus interest upon dissolution of
the co-operative. This essentially anti-capitalistic co-operative
principle is frequently omitted from co-operative legislation and it
does not form part of the Industrial and Provident Societies Acts.
The participation of outside investors and the opportunity for
investors to receive surplus assets on dissolution, when taken
together, constitute a self-destructive mechanism; the likelihood of
it being brought into operation increases with the degree of
economic success experienced by the co-operative. cPss were not
themselves at fault. Indeed, the most successful ones were
frequently dissolved because of the phenomenon.
In definitional terms, cpss incorporated under the Industrial
and Provident Societies Acts were and are autonomous, providing for
employees to become members by purchasing a nominal amount of
share capital. They were managed democratically, with employees
participating directly at all levels of management as well as sharing
in the profits.21
The experience of the American Plywood Co-operatives is
similarly instructive.22 Although productivity was 10 percent higher
than at non-co-operative mills, all were seen to suffer from
inadequate financing, shortage of working capital, and difficulty in
obtaining adequate timber reserves. In these plywood co-operatives
it also proved difficult to maintain high productivity and wage
equality in the absence of high morale and personal commitment to
21 lbid at 35.
2 2 See, for example, C. Bellas, IndustrialDemocracy and the Worker-Owned Firm: A Study
of Twenty-one Plywood Companies in the Pacific North West (New York: Praeger, 1972).
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the co-operativeP Long-term planning proved problematic as the
members were generally more concerned about short-term gains.
24
Much of what caused difficulties may have been due to the
co-operatives' membership structure. Contrary to worker co-
operative principles, many of the co-operative mills employed a large
number of non-member workers. In addition, non-workers were
admitted as members and were entitled to vote. In terms of selling
shares, these co-operatives acted rather like private corporations
with the requirement that a new member be acceptable to the
present owners. Also, there were provisions for co-operatives to buy
the shares of departing members at the market price with the
intention either to sell them to a suitable new member or to
increase the value of the present members' stakes in the co-
operative.
The plywood co-operatives faced their most serious
difficulties as a result of their ownership structure. The value of the
owners' shares grew to large dollar amounts in the most successful
co-operatives, and in many cases the members decided to sell the
enterprise to a conventional corporation. This was especially
attractive to long-term members, and also was generally attractive
because the plywood trade was a volatile one prone to frequent
fluctuations in business activity. Frequently if a member was retiring
or wished to leave the co-operative, the co-operative itself either did
not have the resources to buy the member out or experienced
problems in finding a replacement with sufficient capital to buy into
the co-operative. As a result, viable, successful plywood co-
operatives disintegrated or were purchased by capitalist enterprises.
In conclusion, then, traditionally organized worker co-
operatives have been less than successful. This is a consequence of
structural problems, which can be resolved if they are addressed
early in the co-operative's life or at the commencement of its
operations.
23 Ibid. at 245.
24 bid at 29.
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IV. OTHER WORKER CO-OPERATIVE LEGISLATIVE
MODELS
A. Worker Co-operative Legislation in the UK
In the u.I a group of worker-owned corporations, dissatisfied
with the legal frameworks available to them, pressed for and
obtained passage of The Industrial Common Ownership Act, 1976
(IcoA).25 This statute defines Common Ownership Enterprises and
provides financial assistance to such enterprises. Finding both
corporation law and co-operative law unsatisfactory, the Industrial
Common Ownership Movement (icoM), the organization of
Industrial Common Ownership (ico) co-operatives and the driving
force behind the legislative changes, opted for incorporation and
regulation under a reformed co-operative law regime.
The Act defines a Common Ownership Enterprise in a
precise and comprehensive fashion, as do the regulations for
incorporating ico co-operatives. The Act also defines co-operative
enterprises, as compared to common ownership enterprises, although
it does so in a most cursory fashion. Section 2(2) merely states that
for an enterprise to be a co-operative, the trading surplus must be
distributed to the members, the enterprise should be controlled by
"a majority of the people working for" it or its subsidiaries, and it
must be "in substance a co-operative association."26  The Act's
purpose in defining these enterprises is to delineate the
organizations which are eligible to receive certain government grants
and loans: namely, grants and loans administered by the "relevant
bodies" which the appropriate government official recognizes as
being "constituted for the purpose of encouraging the development
of common ownership enterprises or co-operative enterprises."27
25 1976, c. 78.
26 See generally C.S. Axworthy, "Consumer Co-operatives and the Rochdale Principles
To-day" (1977) 15 Osgoode Hall L. J. 137; C.S. Axworthy, "Credit Unions in Canada: The
Dilemma of Success" (1981) 31 U. Toronto L. J. 72.
27 Supra, note 25, s. 1(5). In 1976 a small (t250,000) fund for the support of new co-
operatives was established.
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To facilitate registration under the Industrial and Provident
Societies Acts,28 ICOM prepared a set of Model Rules acceptable to
the Registrar for use by prospective ico co-operatives. The
intention behind the Model Rules was that they be used without the
need for a lawyer. Any advice required is supplied by the Registrar
or by ICOM, thus generating a considerable financial saving. The
objects clause of the Model Rules shows the non-business side of
ICOM and reflects the Christian roots of the movement. Part of the
objects clause of the Model Rules, section 2(b), states that "the Co-
operative shall have regard to promoting the physical, mental and
spiritual well-being of the community ... and to assist people in need
by any means whatsoever."
29
ico enterprises are bona fide co-operative societies registered
or deemed to be registered under the Industrial and Provident
Societies Acts of 1965 to 1975. They have no share capital, but are
limited by guarantee. Their constitutions must provide that only
employees of the enterprise or a subsidiary may be members, and all
employees may be members subject to conditions relating to age,
length of employment and other requirements, provided there is no
political or religious discrimination.3 ° All members are to have equal
voting rights at meetings. Assets are only to be handed over to the
members for value. Profits are to be shared amongst the members.
On dissolution, after satisfaction of all liabilities, assets are not to be
distributed to the members but are to be transferred to a central
fund maintained for the benefit of common ownership enterprises or
used for charitable purposes. Lastly, the enterprise is controlled by
a majority of those working in it and in a subsidiary of it, should
one exist
28 1965, c. 12. See How to Form an Industrial Co-operative (London: I.C.O.M., 1979).
29 See P. Cockerton & A. Whyatt, The Workers Co-operative Handbook (London:
I.C.O.M., 1984).
30 At any one time a majority of employees must be members. However, as some
employees may choose not to join the co-operative and others may be serving a qualifying
period imposed by some co-operatives, not all employees will necessarily be members. Thus
all members are employees, but not all employees are members.
31 Supra, note 25, s. 2.
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Regulation 6(b) provides that "all people employed by the
co-operative have the right to be members of it and thus participate
in the decision-making process. 32 This is an expression of ICOM's
philosophy that non-workers should not be members. It internalizes
the ownership such as it is; from past experience this is clearly
advisable. The converse is also the case - all workers should be
members, thus preventing any exploitation of non-member employees
by the members and the enterprise.33 In the same vein, members
are not considered investors. Of course, members can be required
to, and frequently do, lend money to the enterprise, generally
through a delay in wage payment. In such cases they will receive an
adequate but limited return on their loans. This complies with the
co-operative principle that assets remaining after dissolution of a co-
operative should be used for co-operative development or other
charitable purposes. The Industrial Common Ownership Act clearly
stipulates that these principles must be adhered to in order for the
enterprise in question to be recognized as a common ownership
enterprise.
Member-employees own the firm collectively rather than
individually. Thus, the nominal share capital (valued at £1) does not
entitle the bearer to a percentage of assets of the company; rather,
it serves as a "membership ticket. ''34 This is made explicit in the
Industrial Common Ownership Act which prohibits the transfer of
assets to members except for value.35 In effect, common ownership
is more like membership than actual ownership and as a result,
member-owners do not own shares in their enterprise. As a
consequence, rather than the liability of the enterprise's members
being limited by shares, it is limited by guarantee. There is
provision for profit sharing. All members are entitled to a profit
share above their regular wage, with the share size determined by
the general meeting.36
32 Supra, note 29.
33 See the conclusions of Bellas, supra, note 22.
34 Oakeshott, supra, note 15 at 105.
35 Supra, note 25, s. 2(1)(b)(ii).
36 Supra, note 25, Regulation 14.
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The Model Rules specify that profits are to be distributed to
general reserves, to the members in the form of a bonus and for
social and charitable purposes. The general membership decides on
the proportions to be allocated to each purpose, but it seems that
the Rules envisage the order of priority to be reserves first, bonuses
second and disbursements for charitable purposes, including support
for sister co-operatives, third. A common arrangement pioneered by
the Scott Bader Commonwealth 3 7 is for 60 percent of the surplus to
be retained as reserves with the remainder divided equally between
bonuses and charitable donations.38 Unlike ordinary company
shares, the membership share in an ico firm does not entitle the
member to a dividend. As well, profit sharing is strictly egalitarian,
with every member receiving the same bonus. This is in sharp
contrast to the co-operative principle of dividends according to
patronage.
Upon dissolution of the company, assets are likewise not
distributed individually among the members. The model rules
provide -that if, upon winding up,
any of its assets remain to be disposed of after its liabilities are satisfied, the assets
shall not be distributed among the members but shall be transferred to ... a
common ownership enterprise or ... a central fund maintained for the benefit of
common ownership enterprises ... or shall be held for charitable purposes3 9
37 See the description of this pioneering enterprise and its development in Oakeshott,
supra, note 15 at 75-78, E.F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if
People Mattered (London: Blond and Briggs, 1973) at 230-37. The birth of the British
Industrial Common Ownership Movement can be traced to the establishment of the Scott
Bader Commonwealth in 1951. In 1983 this highly successful plastic resins manufacturer
experienced profits of £1.5 million and had 750 employees. See Cockerton & Whyatt, supra,
note 29 at 71. It was turned over to its employees by the original owner, Ernest Bader, a
Quaker interested in economic reform. Since then the company has grown one-hundredfold.
The company has been very influential in the worker co-operative movement in the U.K.
through its establishment of the ICOM support group to propagate the development of worker
co-operatives. Of particular interest to the present discussion is the legal form invented by
Scott Bader which has largely been duplicated in the subsequent development of ICOM co-
operatives.
38 Oakeshott, supra, note 15 at 114.
39 Supra, note 25, Regulation 18.
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Members have no claim to the full output of the firm and cannot
claim a residual value after dissolution; they collectively own the firm
but cannot claim its assets. Consequently they are in a distinctly
different situation from that of ordinary corporate shareholders as
regards dissolution of their respective enterprises. The latter can
claim a share of liquidated assets in proportion to their holding in
the company, whereas ico firm members cannot.
This kind of property is an amalgam of both private and
social property. The member of an ico firm is entitled to important
incidents of title - control of the work place, participation in policy
making, determining the disposition of profits - yet does not have
legal title. As a result, the members cannot freely alienate their
shares in the co-operative. The democratic control of the co-
operative and the requirement that only members be permitted to
exercise a franchise within the structure give the firm many of the
characteristics of public property, rather than simply private property
held as an aggregate of individualities.
In one sense, then, the co-operative is a form of collective
property. However, other characteristics of the ico co-operatives
distinguish it from a pure collective. An ico co-operative is not like
a kibbutz or a Hutterite colony, both of which can loosely be
characterized as collective property. The rights of membership,
wherein the members in general meeting have ultimate authority
over the firm, give members the political and social benefits of
property. Control over the disposition of assets, but not a full
entitlement to the surplus, gives members important economic
benefits of property. Only the right of free alienability, the
distinguishing characteristic of capitalist private property, is lacking.
Once created, an ico co-operative will continue to exist as a co-
operatively held entity, although membership will change.
It is this characteristic of non-distribution upon dissolution
that makes this form of property so durable. The disintegrating
forces at work on early producer co-operatives will not destroy a
worker co-operative established under the ico model. The lure of
capital gains cannot seduce individual members because they have
no authority to destroy, as individuals, what they have created
collectively. The co-operative as an artificial person truly has a life
of its own, and is not merely a fragmented holding by a collection
of individuals temporarily joined together for mutual gain.
[VOL. 27 Nqo. 4
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ico co-operatives recognize that growth in a corporation is
due to a congruence of capital input and labour. As production on
a societal basis necessarily involves a division of labour, all working
people should benefit, not just the holders of capital. However,
individuals should not be able to realize the economic benefits
created over several generations by dividing the spoils amongst
themselves. Members must pass on for posterity what they received
from the past and have themselves created. In this sense, the Ico
co-operatives employ a sense of stewardship, rather than just
ownership, seeking to preserve economic assets and not merely to
exploit them.
This is a very distinctive model of co-operative property. As
the result of attempting to create a core of non-alienable property
that will be permanently removed from the free market of property,
it has been heavily criticized, particularly by proponents of
Mondragon-style co-operatives, which are discussed below. The
main criticism of what Oakeshott terms "high-minded coops" is that
collective ownership will destroy the economic incentive to maximize
profits.40 These co-operatives, it is argued, will lose the higher
productivity effects observed in other worker co-operatives, because
members will not receive all the benefits of more efficient
production. Another economic critique is that removing capital
reserves from the individual control of members will discourage
capitalization from retained earnings and force the co-operative to
rely heavily on borrowed capital.41 Theoretical criticism such as this
is belied by the unmistakable success of the ico co-operatives in the
u.. In 1978, Oakeshott could still point to the dearth of common
ownership enterprises to support his contention that ordinary
workers would never choose to belong to a co-operative that denied
them full individuated ownership of capital assets.42 However,
membership in worker co-operatives in the u.Ic is now in excess of
6,000, with 90 percent of new co-operatives registering under ICOM
40 Supra, note 15 at 84.
41 K. Bradley & A. Gelb, '"he Replication and Sustainability of the Mondragon
Experiment" (1982) 20 Br. J. of Indus. Rels. 21.
42 Supra, note 15.
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model rules.43 The common ownership structure has proven itself
to be relatively popular with uc workers.44
With regard to membership and majority control, the Act
stipulates that the ico enterprise be controlled by a majority of the
members, so the Model Rules demand that a majority of the people
working in the enterprise be members. To allow managers to make
necessary but unpopular decisions, the Rules sensibly provide for Ico
firms to appoint managers for a fixed period of time. Were it not
for such a provision, it is clear that managers' positions would
frequently be quite untenable and uncertain. With this security,
managers are able to address long-term issues as well as short-term
ones without immediate fear of losing their jobs. Control of the
enterprise is vested in the membership which has the right to select
the board of directors (termed the Committee in the Model Rules)
by majority ballot. Regulation 10 provides that the general meeting
of the membership is the basic governing body of the co-operative,
with power to elect and recall board members on a majority ballot
basis, every member being entitled to one vote.45 The Committee
in turn appoints the management. Thus the membership has direct
formal control over the policy-making aspect of the firm and indirect
control over executive power exercised by managers.
The Regulations provide for consultation with appropriate
trade unions before loans are made.46  This holds true even where
Cockerton & Whyatt, supra, note 29 at 5, 10.
44 The local government programmes available to ICOM co-operatives arc a powerful
force. See Axworthy, supra, note 15.
45 Supra, note 25, Regulation 11.
46 Regulations under the Act provide that only common ownership and co-operative
enterprises wholly or mainly engaged in the manufacturing sector are eligible to receive
assistance. It is unfortunate that grants and loans are not available to enterprises wishing to
become, but not yet, involved in manufacturing. It would seem only sensible to provide
assistance for feasibility studies and start-up. Similarly, there are no grants or loans for
worker co-operatives engaged in the service industry, even if they want to move into the
manufacturing sector. The Regulations also limit the purpose for which loans can be made:
Regulation 3 stipulates that loans are only available for the whole or part of fixed and working
capital requirements of the enterprise and then only for an "identified project" which has a
"reasonable prospect of success." The local government assistance programmes do not have
these same limitations (see Axworthy, supra, note 15 at 33-36, 41.42, 51-55). Under the ICO
Act, if a loan is to be made in excess of £7500 (about $13,000), the appropriate government
official must approve it and may attach any conditions seen fit. Furthermore, loans are to be
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the worker-members do not belong to a union. The unions which
will have to be consulted when a non-unionized worker co-operative
applies for a loan are those which would normally represent workers
of those trades, professions and skills in unionized enterprises.
Consultation with trade unions can be seen as merely a political act,
but it is a useful and valid exhortation to obtain as much
information as possible in order to make the decision on the loan as
effectively as possible.
The money available under the Act to both co-operative and
common ownership enterprises is not large, but does represent a
commitment to the idea of worker co-operatives. Similarly, the Act,
being a private member's bill, had to receive unanimous support in
the House of Commons and thus all-party support. Too
adventurous a scheme would not have achieved this degree of
support. In fact, local governments have established extensive
assistance programmes for such economic organizations, 47 even
though the national government in the uic. is not at all sympathetic
to worker-owned enterprises.48
Individual equity co-operatives still predominate in France,
Mondragon (in the Basque region of Northern Spain) and Italy, all
of which have thriving worker co-operative sectors. But IcoM
provides an alternative model that appears to have durability, and a
more egalitarian distribution of property and power in a co-operative
firm.
adequately secured unless the relevant body believes the prospects of success of the project
would be seriously jeopardized. In that case, security can be completely or partially dispensed
with (Regulation 4). The loans are interest-bearing at, or above, the rate prescribed by the
appropriate government official and interest is payable at least annually with the principal
repayable within five years (Regulation 5). Interest can be accumulated for the first three
years of the loan and added to the principal to accommodate enterprises where, according to
the relevant body, the project in question would be seriously jeopardized by a requirement that
interest be payable annually or at shorter intervals from the outset (Regulation 6).
47 See Axvorthy, supra, note 15 at 28-55.
4 8 bid.
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B. Worker Co-operative Legislation in the U.S.: Mondragon-Style
Worker Co-operatives
The iCOM approach to worker co-operatives can be
contrasted to that represented by the Massachusetts Employee
Cooperative Corporations Act 1982.49 It follows the Mondragon
model of worker co-operative organization which has been so
successful that many observers have been prompted to seek to apply
it to other locations. The statute provides that a business
corporation may elect to become an "employee cooperative." In
order to do so the co-operative must issue a class of voting shares
called "membership shares" - one, and only one, of which shall be
owned by each employee member. Only full- or part-time
employees can be members. These membership shares are to
constitute the only voting shares in the co-operative. Earnings from
the activities of the co-operative are to be apportioned and
distributed in accordance with the proportion of the worker-
member's work to the total work contributed by all of the members.
The earnings can be retained by the co-operative and provision for
an intricate system of internal capital accounts offers a means of
keeping records.50 The statute also deals with a hybrid form of co-
operative, which bears many similarities to an Employee Stock
Ownership Plan (EsoP) and a profit-sharing capitalist firm. However,
the pure Mondragon-style co-operative aspects of the Act will be
the focus of analysis in the remainder of this section.
The legal structure in the worker co-operative legislation
recently passed in Massachusetts5 l and other states5 2 (sponsored by
the Industrial Cooperative Association (iCA)) is closely modelled on
the Mondragon experience, and is framed in concepts accessible to
St. Mass. 1982, c. 104, para 3. For discussions of the model followed by the very
successful group of worker co-operatives in Mondragon, Northern Spain, which inspires this
Act see the sources referred to supra, note 15.
50 Ibid at para. 10.
51 M.G.L. c. 157A (1982).
52 Maine, Connecticut, Vermont and New York have also passed similar worker co-
operative legislation. See P. Pitegoff, "Organizing Worker Coops" (1985) 7 Law and Pol. Q.
45 at 48.
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Canadian audiences. For the purposes of this paper it will be
beneficial to discuss the provisions of the Massachusetts Act as
representative of Mondragon-style worker co-operative legislation.
The framework for this form of worker co-operative is
described by the principal drafters of the legislation as follows: "The
legal structure of the worker cooperative, which assigns membership
rights (the voting and net income rights) to the workers' role,
implements two fundamental normative principles: the democratic
theory of government and the labor theory of property."
53
The basic thrust of the ICA Model Legislation is its
recognition of three factors: that democratic self-government in the
work place is critical, that property is essentially the production of
labour, and that labourers have a moral right to their own product
and thus should legally own whatever property they produce.5 4
There are several noteworthy characteristics of the
Massachusetts law. For example, an ordinary corporation can
become an employee co-operative by amending its by-laws.55 In
terms of membership, only employees can be members of the co-
operative, and members are issued with shares designated as voting
stock.5 6  Non-members can be issued non-member stock and are
entitled to approve amendments to the structure of the co-operative
which affect their interest, such as the issue of more stock. This
measure is intended to allow "creative financing schemes built upon
stock sales to non-members" and to ease the "gradual conversion of
existing business corporations to employee corporations."58 However,
ultimate control remains with the workers on the principle of one
worker-one vote: only members can vote to issue voting stock other
53 D. Ellerman & P. Pitegoff, 'The Democratic Corporation: The New worker
Cooperative Statute in Massachusetts" (1983) N.Y.U. Rev. Law and Social Change 441 at 460.
54 See D. Ellerman, Theory of Legal Structure (Somerville, Mass.: Industrial Cooperative
Association, 1983) for a fuller explanation.
55 Supra, note 49 at para. 3.
56 Ibid at para. 6.
5 7 Ibic at para. 7.
58 Supra, note 53 at 457.
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than membership shares.59 The co-operative must issue 'patronage
allocations," or profit shares based on work contribution.U The co-
operative may also set up an internal capital account for each
member. This account reflects appreciation in stock value and
serves to separate the capital value of a membership share from its
voting privileges. This innovation allows new members to join the
firm without having to buy out older members, a problem that has
developed with traditional co-operative structures such as the
Northwest plywood co-operatives.61
If the co-operative so chooses, it can be structured as a
replica of a Mondragon co-operative by following the system
outlined in section 10 of the Act. These "internal capital account
co-operatives" are wholly member-owned, with all assets of the firm
either listed in individual capital accounts or in collective reserves.
Retained earnings are to be divided among these accounts. Non-
employees cannot hold capital or voting stock in the co-operative.
The members of the co-operative can vote to transform it into an
ordinary corporation by a two-thirds vote 62 and having done so,
membership shares and internal capital accounts will be transferred
into ordinary shares of the newly established corporation. 63 If the
co-operative remains a co-operative, members who leave it have the
right to have their membership shares redeemed, with the price of
redemption determined by reference to the members' internal capital
accounts.64
Due to pressure from the State Bar, the Mondragon-style co-
operative model was not made mandatory for coverage under the
Act. "The result of legislative compromise is a statute that
authorises, but does not prescribe, the Mondragon model for
59Tkid at 454.
60 Supra, note 49 at para. 8.
61 See Bellas, supra, note 22.
62 Supra, note 49 at para. 4.
63 Ibid at para. 11.
64 Ibid at para. 9.
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structuring a worker cooperative."65 However, the Act's distinctive
contribution to legal structure lies in the Mondragon-style co-
operative model which is under discussion here. It is this form of
co-operative that makes membership rights a functional role of
employment, in contrast to the capitalist hybrid firms where
individual control increases with share ownership.
Membership requirements are formally similar to those of
other co-operatives. Only members can be employed by the co-
operative and no one outside the firm can control any equity capital.
Thus, in the familiar co-operative manner, capital serves labour,
rather than labour serving capital. Thomas and Logan describe the
process of capital accumulation at Mondragon as having rather
contradictory objectives. They write that "capital resources are
allocated with two objectives: to gradually increase the capital
intensity of production in order to integrate new technological
develo ments, and to create the highest possible number of new
jobs."2 However, an important difference is that these co-operatives
usually require a considerable capital contribution from each member
upon joining. The Mondragon experience is a relevant guide to
how the structure established under the ICA statute will operate.
Mondragon requires a contribution equal to the annual wage of the
lowest paid worker at Mondragon from each worker entering a co-
operative. 67 This works out to about 20 percent of the start-up
capital of new co-operatives, with another 20 percent provided by
the government and 60 percent lent by the Caja Laboral Popular -
the bank of the Mondragon worker co-operative system.68 Ellerman
terms the firm a democratic community rather than a piece of
property, but this capital contribution gives the firm a greater affinity
with the property-owning democracies of the seventeenth century
than with the universal franchise of today. Membership can no
longer be open to any worker or unemployed person. It is only
65 Supra, note 53 at 457.
6 6 H. Thomas & C. Logan, Mondragon: An Economic Analysis (London: George Allen
& Unwin, 1982) at 186.
67 Oakeshott, supra, note 15 at 191.
68 A.G. Johnston & W.F. Whyte, "The Mondragon System of Worker Production Coops"
(1977) 31 Indus. & Lab. Rels. Rev. 18 at 21.
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open to those who can raise the necessary membership fee from
savings or through borrowing. Worker co-operatives operating a
system such as this generally provide for regular deductions to be
made from the contributing members' paycheques. Such a large
personal capital contribution provides a stark contrast with the ico
co-operatives and radically alters the nature of the co-operative
membership. ico co-operatives grant membership in a firm and
commensurate control over capital as of right, simply for being a
member-employee.
Control of the co-operative is formally vested in the
membership. Only members can make important decisions on
matters such as the issue of stock, sharing of profits, and dissolution,
but several factors limit this democratic control. In the Mondragon
system, the Caja plays an important part in controlling the individual
co-operatives, due to its large loan position in the capital base of
the firm and its continual monitoring of the co-operative's
performance. Similarly, the Mondragon-style co-operative model is
also open to some form of external control. Although a central
financing agency has not been developed in the u.s. or Canada
serving this type of worker co-operative, this icA model allows for
equity to be issued to non-members, thus turning over partial control
to outside interests. Even in Mondragon-style co-operatives, where
no external ownership is permitted, lending institutions may acquire
capital interests through secured financing arrangements. This form
of effective power is also possible in ico co-operatives, and, indeed,
in any economic organization.
Finally, differential control within the firm is assured by the
emphasis on individual equity ownership. Although each member
will formally have the same vote, there is little doubt that long-term
members with larger internal capital accounts will command greater
influence over the policy of the co-operative than newer members
with smaller investments. A democracy of inequality inevitably leads
to elite rule.
The main difference between Mondragon-style worker co-
operatives and other forms of worker ownership is the emphasis in
the former on individual ownership of equity. This is at the core of
the theory behind these co-operatives where the labour theory of
property is to be implemented simultaneously with democratic self-
management in the firm. Members are entitled to their ordinary
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wage plus the bulk of retained earnings (actual or deferred). At
Mondragon, while it has varied over time, about 70 percent of the
surplus of each co-operative is allocated to individual capital
accounts, with the remainder split between community contributions
and co-operative reserves.69 Members have a right to this account
upon leaving, although the co-operative may retain up to 30 percent
of the account upon pay-out.70 Members are entitled to a fair rate
of interest on their accounts. Oakeshott states that this interest is
a factor in determining future profit shares. As profit is distributed
according to member income, and as interest payments on internal
capital accounts are included in income, larger equity positions are
given a greater profit share.71 Ellerman and Pitegoff are ambiguous
as to whether a similar provision applies in the ICA Mondragon-
based model. They state that "patronage allocation" is based on
"relative amount of work, usually measured by hours of work or
total wages."72 In order to avoid paying tax on these allocations, the
earnings must be distributed according to patronage, which in a
worker co-operative is based on labour, rather than relative capital
investment.73 The ambiguity arises in how the interest payments on
internal capital accounts are to be classified. Are they interest on
capital nominally loaned to the co-operative, or should the interest
payment be considered part of wages because the internal capital
account is theoretically deferred wages? If interest on deferred
wages is also considered wages, it should figure in the distribution of
profits, as it does in Mondragon.
Regardless of whether interest payments are considered in
the distribution of retained earnings, there will still be unequal
distribution of profits which will clearly establish a two-tiered
membership. Older members with larger capital accounts will
benefit disproportionately from increases in retained earnings. There
will be differential rewards to members even if the profits are
69 IbMd at 22.
70 Oakeshott, supra, note 15 at 191.
71 bid at 193.
72 Supra, note 53 at 455.
73 bid. at 456.
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distributed solely according to wages. This is so because, in all
likelihood, there will be differential wages according (at least partly)
to seniority of position in the firm. Secondly, older members with
larger capital accounts will command large interest income which
must come out of retained earnings even before profits are
distributed to the accounts. Therefore, they will receive a greater
benefit from interest payments, plus profit share and wages, than will
new members.
It should be noted that Ellerman and Pitegoff are well aware
of the difficulties which differential ownership poses for the
continued democratic existence of worker co-operatives. In fact,
they criticize EsoPs and the Plywood co-operatives because of "an
inherent tendency toward increasing concentration of capital
ownership."74 Should the co-operative be successful, share prices
will become very large; this will make it difficult for new members
to buy out retiring workers. This problem is at the heart of the
separation of membership shares from internal capital accounts, as
the system is designed to avoid the degenerative problems associated
with the plywood co-operatives. 75
However, the internal capital account solution has only
confronted an external manifestation of an underlying problem. The
Mondragon-style worker co-operative model partially answers the
problem of inter-generational collapse of co-operatives by requiring
the co-operative as a firm to pay out internal capital accounts, while
separating the admission-ticket membership shares so they can be
sold at a fixed value. But the reality of differential ownership in a
democratic institution is not addressed. Ellerman and Pitegoff claim
that this bifurcation of democratic membership shares and private
property internal capital accounts means that a worker co-operative
"is not owned at all - it is a democratic social institution."76 In
practice, however, this will certainly not be the case. Differential
profit shares and unequal equity control will negatively affect the co-
operative in two ways, one political and one economic.
74 kiL at 445.
75 D.F. Wade, "Employee Ownership: Alternative Financing Models" (1984) 2(2) Econ.
Dev. Rev. 53 at 56.
76 Supra, note 53 at 464.
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The political issues have been canvassed in the discussion on
control. Economic leverage inevitably leads to political influence, as
can readily be seen in society at large. Even though members with
larger internal capital accounts would still only have one formal vote,
their influence due to their greater ownership would doubtless be
greater. The economic problem reflects the dichotomy at the heart
of the Mondragon-style model's reliance on the twin pillars of
democracy and labour property. Democratic rights are inherent in
the individual and are by definition held equally. Democracy cannot
function without equality, thus all votes count the same. Every
citizen is held to have an equal and inalienable right to exercise
power in whatever arena is democratically controlled. In the
democratic state, the right is expressed in the power to choose
governments. In the worker co-operative or democratic ESOP it is
the right to choose directors. Individual involvement and
participation in policy setting and management in some way, in
addition to franchise, establishes participatory democracy. However,
the labour property theory leads to diametrically opposite
conclusions. By granting differential distribution of economic values,
the firm is sanctioning inequality. Although all members contribute
to the co-operative through their labour, those members with the
longest service and membership can command a larger share of
values. Thus membership in the democratic community of the co-
operative is not equal; it is differentiated in a hierarchy based on
length of service. This is chain-letter democracy - the latest
additions to the chain must pay value to the first in line and receive
the right to command the same values from those hired later.
Although all members contribute to the co-operative through
their labour, the first members can command a larger share of
values. Individuals have a right to own what they individually create,
but the product of the modern firm is a collective effort based on
a division of labour. Surpluses are a result of community effort, not
merely combined individualities. Assume worker A is the first
member of the co-operative. All that he or she produces is due to
his or her own effort. Now worker B joins. Their joint effort
creates a larger output. But A claims a larger share as interest on
his or her capital. How can labour theory distinguish between the
additional value created by B and the contribution of A's capital in
the form of stored labour value? The addition of external loan
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capital and many workers further complicates the problem. The
Mondragon-style worker co-operative model does not recognize
production as a social endeavour and thus the firm never becomes
social property. Instead it remains aggregated individual property;
a partnership of small capitalists, rather than a co-operative. In
effect, labour still serves capital, but the capital is held by fellow
members, rather than by a capitalist or outside shareholders.
The contradiction is exacerbated by the members' power to
dissolve the co-operative. The ability of individuals to appropriate
disproportionate shares of combined property leads inexorably to
pressure to dissolve the co-operative. The ability of individuals to
appropriate disproportionate shares of combined property leads
inexorably to pressure to dissolve the co-operative. This is the same
difficulty encountered by the plywood co-operatives in the Pacific
North West of the United States. Once a certain proportion of the
membership has obtained a large capital stake in the co-operative,
they will also be able to lay claim to a share of common reserve
funds should the co-operative dissolve or revoke its election to be
governed by the employee co-operative statute. Success of the co-
operative will lead to economic pressure to dissolve.
Even if it does not dissolve, the co-operative will have
difficulties sustaining its existence. In order to retain control within
the co-operative and to permit individual members to realize their
shares, retiring members must be paid out. But this would lead to
a serious capital drain on the co-operative's resources, especially if
a large number of members were eligible for pay-out simultaneously.
The Mondragon system overcomes this conflict between labour
mobility and the need to retain equity in the co-operative through
a naturally low mobility rate for workers.77 In Canada there is no
such commitment to place, except perhaps in certain rural
communities. Thus, the problem of preventing decapitalization
through labour turnover would be a serious threat to the long-term
viability of the worker co-operative.
It can be seen that the Mondragon-style worker co-operative
model presents serious problems for legislatures seeking a permanent
and democratic form of worker ownership. The emphasis on
77 Bradley & Gelb, supra, note 41 at 27.
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individual ownership leading to differential rewards and the
consequent pressure to dissolve the co-operative, or, alternatively, to
bleed it slowly through individual capital haemorrhages, lead to
serious doubts about the durability of this form of property. The
peculiar factors in Mondragon, particularly the centralizing influence
of the Caja, make it doubtful that the success experienced there
could be transplanted to Canada. It might be better to consider an
ICOM scheme or a legislative imposition of worker ownership as in
Sweden. However, these last two approaches may be too ambitious
in the Canada of the late 1980s and 1990s.
C. France: The 1978 Worker Co-operative Law
In 1978 a new law on worker co-operatives was enacted in
France.78 It is predicated on a number of general principles.79 In
the context of this Act membership and employment in a worker co-
operative are seen as irretrievably linked.80 Democratic management
is enshrined as a principle. Directors and officers are elected on a
one member-one vote basis. The surplus, after providing for taxes,
internal reserves and interest on capital, is to be distributed to
members and non-members on the basis of a formula tied to hours
worked. There appears to be no limit placed on interest on capital
except that it cannot exceed the amount distributed to workers.81
The property of the co-operative is seen as collective property. In
addition, the worker co-operative is seen as a business with three
objectives: to ensure profitable operations, to ensure high levels of
productivity and to raise the necessary capital from the members for
78 La loi n' 78-763 du 19 juillet 1978, publi6e au Journal Officiel du 20 juillet 1978. See
also Le Nouveau Statut Juridique Des Socidets Coop ratives Ouvridres De Production, an undated
publication of La Confedfration des SCOPs, from which most of the information in this
section is derived.
79 P. Jones, "Development Choices For A Law Of Workers Co-operatives" (Faculty of
Law, University of Toronto, 1983) [unpublished] at 98-99.
80 Non-member workers are a common feature of French worker co-operatives,
consequently this notion should be seen more as an exhortation than an operating principle.
81 Jones, supra, note 79 at 99.
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future operations.82 Primarily, however, such worker co-operatives
are seen as organizations which worker-members own and control.
In their relationship to co-operative principles, and worker
co-operative principles in particular, French worker co-operatives
exhibit some interesting departures from what might be expected.
They do not actively discourage non-member workers and they do
not operate on the principle of limited rate of return on capital;
indeed the standard by-laws refer to a minimum return on capital,
but no maximum.8 3 Also, the surplus is distributed to all the
workers, not just the members. This is a fairer means of distributing
surplus and is presumably based on the notion that all workers, not
just the members, should be entitled to a share of the surplus
because they worked to ensure it.
As Jones has noted, Antoni isolated seven principles from
the pre-1978 regime.8 4 First, membership was and is based on
admission by the present members. A worker could not join just
by buying a share; he or she must be admitted by membership. A
free association of workers was what was envisaged. Consequently,
the second principle provided that shares not be transferable. Third,
control was to be on the basis of one member-one vote. Fourth,
limited return on capital was recognized as a general operating
principle; Antoni felt it important that capital be put to work for
labour rather than vice versa.85 Fifth, reserve funds were to have
priority over members' shares of the surplus. This was to ensure
that the co-operatives reinvested adequate sums of capital to ensure
their survival and expansion. Sixth, the property of the co-operative
was seen as collective, so the reserves were not designated as
members' individual property in any way. The seventh principle
dealt with dissolution: the assets remaining after satisfying the
liabilities of the co-operative were to be distributed not to the
82 1bid at 100.
83 Ibid
8 4 ]bid- at 102.
85 This is discussed in the context of the minimum interest on capital figure now in
operation; see infra.
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members, but to another co-operative or to a federation of co-
operatives.
French worker co-operatives have taken a pragmatic
approach to the form of organizational model they follow. They are
incorporated as private corporations with virtually no restrictions as
to the activities they pursue. Worker co-operatives must clearly
indicate that they are such in all forms of correspondence they use.
If the worker co-operative is incorporated as a socijtg anonyme
(SA), 8 6 it must have at least seven worker-members; if it is
incorporated as a soci& ii responsabilitM limit~e (Sarl)87 it must have
at least four worker-members. The law does not require these
worker-members to be full-time employees. There are no
restrictions on the employment of non-members. There are,
however, detailed rules about membership in the 1978 Act. Worker
co-operatives in France view the legal regime in a manner which
appropriately reflects their priorities: the federation of French
worker co-operatives (La Conf6d6ration g6n6rale des soci6t6s
coop6ratives ouvri~res de production) feels that the new Act serves
to add to the strength of worker co-operatives and the sector.
There are two regimes under which members may be
admitted to French worker co-operatives. The first is the common-
law regime. This regime will apply if the worker co-operative makes
no other provisions. Under this approach, a candidate for
membership, presented by members, serves a one-year probationary
term. Upon its completion he or she is admitted to membership by
a simple majority vote of the members present and voting. Non-
members must not exceed a stipulated percentage of members.
If worker co-operatives do not wish to be governed by this
legally stipulated scheme they can choose from three other optional
methods for admitting members. The first involves automatic
membership: the by-laws of the worker co-operative can stipulate
that, after serving the required one-year probationary period, the
employee be automatically admitted to membership, or be admitted
to membership unless two-thirds of the members are opposed. The
second option involves an obligation on the part of the candidate.
86 Roughly equivalent to a public business corporation in Canada.
87 Roughly equivalent to a close or private business corporation in Canada.
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There are three possibilities for by-laws here, all based upon the
requirement that candidates put themselves forward for membership.
In the first version the employees, after completing the probationary
period, put themselves forward for membership and have it granted
as of right, unless two-thirds of the members present and voting at
a meeting are opposed. The second has the candidates presenting
themselves and being admitted to membership unless two-thirds of
the membership at the next general meeting are opposed. In the
third version, employees who refuse to put themselves forward for
membership are treated as resigning from the co-operative, which
can then end the contract of employment without facing any
repercussions. The third optional admission regime involves
employees, both members and non-members, investing in the co-
operative. There are tax advantages attached to such investments.
Members no longer employed in the co-operative lose their
membership. This can occur in one of three ways: because the
member resigns, because the membership has voted by a two-thirds
majority to exclude a member for cause, or because the co-operative
unilaterally decides to reimburse the capital of a member who no
longer works for the co-operative. Resignation as a member also
carries with it the loss of the right to work in the co-operative; on
the other hand, retirement does not carry with it the loss of
membership. Losing membership entails losing employment rights,
unless the by-laws provide otherwise.
French worker co-operatives by-laws can require members
to subscribe capital, but worker-members cannot be required to buy
more than one share to join nor, once they have joined, to invest
more than five percent of their annual salary in any year. In the
first ten years of operation of the co-operative, no member can own
more than a quarter of the capital.
In worker co-operatives incorporated as an sA, one-quarter
of the shares required to be subscribed have to purchased at the
time of joining; the remainder can be bought over the next three
years. If the co-operative is incorporated as a SarI, all the required
investment must be made at the time of joining. If the investment
is paid out of salary over a period of time, no more than ten
percent of annual salary can be required to be paid over for this
purpose. The amounts invested in this way are deductible from
taxable income up to a stated per annum maximum. When paying
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out departing members, the co-operative cannot reduce its capital
below the level of half of the maximum envisaged by the
constitution of the co-operative.
If the worker co-operative is formed as an sA, it can choose
an administrative structure based on a board of directors and a
director-general, or it can choose to be governed by a "conseil de
surveillance et directoire." In the event that the worker co-operative
is incorporated as a Sarl, the general meeting of the co-operative
must appoint one or more managers for four years. If a Sarl co-
operative has more than twenty members, it must elect a board of
directors of between three and nine members. All elected officials
must be members, and boards of directors and councils must be
composed of at least two-thirds worker-members.
The surplus must be distributed in a fixed order to ensure
the long-term viability of the co-operatives. Fifteen percent of the
net surplus has to be set aside to a legal reserve until that reserve
is equal to 100 percent of the highest amount of capital stipulated
under the co-operative's constitution. A development reserve can be
created by the by-laws into which some of the surplus can be placed.
Allocation to the employees, both members and non-members,
cannot be less than one-quarter of the net surplus after the
allocation to the legal reserve has been made. The total amount
allocated for interest on capital cannot exceed the amounts allocated
to the employees.
Investors in French worker co-operatives are able to take
advantage of tax incentives. In addition, worker co-operatives in
France can own shares in other worker co-operatives.
The worker co-operative sector in France is growing
steadily.88 The legislative response to the issues confronting the
sector presents an interesting contrast to the other models discussed
in this paper.
88 See Oakeshott, supra, note 15 at 121-44.
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D. Swedish Wage-Earner Funds
No analysis of forms of worker ownership would be complete
without a discussion of wage-earner funds in Sweden. After a ten-
year public debate and the 1982 national election fought on the
issue, Sweden has implemented a comprehensive system of wage-
earner funds. Various schemes for economic democracy were
discussed in Sweden throughout the post-war period, but the idea
received its modem impetus from a report prepared in 1975 by
Rudolph Meidner, an LO (the Swedish Trade Union Confederation)
economist.8 9 The LO subsequently adopted the plan as part of its
programme at its 1976 congress and began to actively lobby the
Swedish Social Democrats to implement it once in power. In 1978,
the Social Democrats adopted a revised version of the plan and then
fought and won the 1982 election on the issue. Wage-earner funds
were given legislative sanction in 1984.
The funds are seen by the Social Democrats as a reflection
of the "Third Democratization" of Swedish public life.90 The first
was political democracy, represented by universal suffrage and
parliamentary democracy. The second was social democracy, with an
emphasis on equal access to economic resources, and was
implemented by a comprehensive welfare programme. The third
democratization is economic democracy, which gives workers the
opportunity to participate in the process of making economic
decisions, rather than simply influencing the policy output through
trade unions and the state.
As initially proposed by the LO, the funds were to solve
several structural problems encountered in the construction of the
Swedish welfare state. Due to the LO policy of "wage-solidarity,"
inequities were arising within the economic system. This wage policy
encourages a policy of equal pay for equal work throughout Sweden.
When national wage negotiations are conducted by the centrally
organized employers and trade union confederations, wage rates are
kept equal across national and industrial lines. However, in
89 K. Ahlfn, "Sweden Introduces Employee Ownership" (1985) 56 Pol. Q. 186 at 189.
90 S.L. Albrecht & S. Deutsch, 'The Challenge of Economic Democracy: Sweden" (1983)
4 Econ. and Indus. Dem. 287 at 309.
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industries that were more efficient or enjoyed natural economies of
location or scale, uniform wage rates tended to create excess profits
in some firms. Some of this excess ended up being used to raise
wages in some sectors, as the wage-solidarity agreement set a floor
on wages, rather than a ceiling. Thus some sectors and firms were
seen to enjoying an inequitable share of the national wage and
profit aggregate. Beyond this peculiarly Swedish problem, arising
from its particular wage policy, the funds were also aimed at
counteracting the international problem of concentration of wealth,
particularly equity holdings, in the hands of a small percentage of
the population. Finally, LO envisaged the funds contributing to
worker influence over their economic environment.
91
When the proposal was adopted by the Social Democrats,
another rationalization for the funds was developed. During the
recent international recession, Sweden's export-oriented economy
was badly hit. Profit levels declined sharply as they did elsewhere,
but Sweden's social contract made it impossible to adopt the solution
implemented by most other Western economies: the deliberate
creation of high unemployment through monetarist policies and
downward pressure on wage rates. The funds were envisaged as a
new source of risk capital for domestic corporations that would lead
to recapitalization and higher profit levels. 92 Altogether, the funds
were seen as likely to assist the expansion of the economy through
higher profit levels without creating unacceptable unemployment or
inequitable distribution of economic resources. The Ministry of
Finance argued that the "most essential task of employee investment
funds in this context will be to help create a distributively acceptable
policy of growth and stabilization."93 In the short term the plans
appear to be successful, particularly in preventing a rise in wage
costs from offsetting the positive effects on profits of the Swedish
krona's devaluation. 94
91 Ibid at 291; Employee Investment Funds (Stockholm: Ministry of Finance, 1984) at
10-11.
92 Ministry of Finance, ibid at 10.
93 bid at 15.
94 Supra, note 89 at 191.
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As finally implemented, the wage-earner funds are an adjunct
of the national pension system. Five separate funds organized on a
regional basis were created in 1984, with employees appointed by
the government forming a majority of directors for each fund. The
local trade union of any corporation in which the fund owns shares
can request that 50 percent of the voting rights for the shares be
transferred to the employees in that corporation. The funds are to
receive Kr 2,000 million annually (approximately C$ 400 million), to
come from a special profit-sharing tax and an employer contribution
of .2 percent of the wage bill. The funds are to continue until 1990
when it is anticipated that they will have a total value of Kr 14,000
million, approximately 5 percent of the value of all publicly listed
shares in Sweden. No combination of funds is to be permitted to
own more than 50 percent of the shares in any single company and
the funds are to provide risk capital for use within Sweden.
Dividends or other returns from the funds are to be transferred to
the national pension system.
It can readily be seen that the funds create a distinct form
of ownership that is neither 6tatist nor capitalist. One observer has
commented that "the diversion of a proportion of profits into
investment funds controlled by wage-earners represented a partial
"socialization" of profits and investment."95 That this is only meant
as a partial buyout of private owners is emphasized by the Swedish
government. It is stated that the funds are not meant to replace the
market economy, but to provide "active reforming efforts to alleviate
the negative effects and restrain the destructive elements of the
market economy [as] a precondition of the survival of that
economy."96
The nature of the property created by the wage-earner funds
can only be understood in the general context of Swedish
employment legislation and trade union organization. Throughout
the 1970s, the Social Democrats passed a series of laws designed to
enhance worker participation. Even in 1970, some observers saw a
possibility of a transition towards worker self-management within a
P. Walters, "Distributing Decline: Swedish Social Democrats and the Crisis of the
Welfare State" (1985) 20 Government and Opposition 356 at 362.
96 Ministry of Finance, supra, note 91 at 17.
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parliamentary democracy as exemplified in such legislation as the Act
on Joint Regulation of Working Life.97 Since that time, laws such as
the Work Environment Act and the Act for Employee Participation
in Decision Making98 have greatly expanded worker control of the
work place. In other words, "the present discussions on economic
democracy build upon an already firmly established commitment to
industrial democracy."9
9
This emphasis on a legislative approach to work-place
democracy explains the LO rejection of corporation-based funds to
achieve economic democracy. Such funds would lead to inequality
of resource distribution, not only the initial distribution as some
corporations are more profitable than others, but also in the future
when large, profitable firms would benefit disproportionately from
the self-generation of capital. Workers who fortuitously were
employed by profitable corporations would benefit while the mass of
employees would not. This would have a disruptive influence on
the wage solidarity policy and could distort the national system of
collective bargaining towards a system of plant bargaining
characteristic of other Western economies 00  Beyond the
inequitable distribution of wealth that would be exacerbated by
corporation-based plans, democratization would occur only on a local
level, rather than in the entire economy. LO believes that "in view
of the fact that the funds are intended as a link in the process of
democratization of working life as a whole, all sections of employees
must have the possibility of exercising influence over the funds."101
A voice in the management of the economy is seen as a direct
extension of citizenship rights belonging inherently to every worker.
As the economy is an aspect of public life, it should be collectively
controlled through wage-earner funds that represent everyone, not
97 G. Hunnius, "The Transition Towards Self-Management in the Industrially Advanced
Countries" (1970) 41-42 Autogestion et Sociolisme 122 at 132.
98 Albrecht & Deutsch, supra, note 90 at 289.
99 Ibid. at 303.
1 00 R. Eidem & B. Ohman, Economic Democracy through Wage-Earner Funds (Stockholm:
Arbetslivscentrum, n.d.) at 36.
101 The Labour Movement and Employee Investment Funds (Stockholm: Swedish Trade
Union Confederation, 1982) at 11.
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merely employees in particular corporations. The heritage of
equality exemplified by political democracy and universal social
programmes in Sweden is continued by a nation-wide system of
wage-earner funds that benefit all working people.
It is clear that the Swedish plan has created a new and
potentially radical form of property.°2 Swedish Social Democratics
have never turned to state ownership as a major tool in
implementing the welfare state. However, the measures described
above have fundamentally altered private property rights, for the
most part without attacking formal ownership. Ownership of
corporate property does not allow the exercise of unilateral power
by employers within the work place, as is the case in Canada, where
control of the work process is firmly in employers' hands and beyond
the scope of collective bargaining. Now, after the creation of the
wager-earner funds, corporate owners can no longer make an
absolute claim to the product of the firm as is their right in
Canada.10 3 Workers have a right to share of the products of the
firm which they administer and direct through the fund boards and
which they appropriate through their pension funds. Thus a new
property right, "an enforceable claim to some use or benefit of
something, 104 has been granted to every Swedish worker as an
incident of employment. It is not something workers have to
purchase, but rights to which they are entitled as workers. This
increase in employee rights has been achieved at the expense of
owners and employers. Thus the new right has both a democratizing
and an equalizing effect.
It can be seen that the wage-earner funds straddle a middle
ground between socialist and capitalist property. Traditional state
socialism holds property in common, claiming that with the abolition
of private property all citizens share in the fruits of their labour.
However, in practice, property is controlled by a bureaucratic 61ite
with concomitant privileges, thereby excluding the masses from using
102 Not all critics agree with this assessment; see E. Asard, "Employee Participation in
Sweden 1971-1979" (1980) 1 Econ. and Indus. Dem. 371.
103 K. Kare, "Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law" in D. Kairys, ed., The Politics
of Law (New York: Pantheon, 1982) at 74.
104 C.B. Macpherson, ed., Property (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978) at 3.
[VOL. 27 No. 4
Worker Ownership
property as a means of self-direction. In capitalism, private property
rules, but there is an inexorable concentration of property in fewer
hands. The wage-earner-fund concept attempts to decentralize
control and ownership by allowing private ownership but
redistributing the incidents of ownership throughout by allowing
private ownership.
This new right is, in itself, quite radical compared with other
Western economies, in that it contains the potential for a complete
democratization of the economy. Certainly the Swedish plan is
slated to stop far short of majority control of corporate property.
However, it is possible to envisage the funds expanding in the
future, progressively democratizing corporate property while
preserving a market economy.
Durability is a major concern with new forms of democratic
property. As the wage-earner funds are backed by the state and
seemingly accepted by the majority of the population, it seems
unlikely that the process could be reversed. Thus, Sweden has
successfully implemented, through legislation, a policy instrument
that achieves two central goals of worker ownership: democratic
participation and economic equality in a durable form. Participation
has been implemented through a series of laws designed to allow
workers a voice in controlling the work environment, and economic
equality has been initiated through the wage-earner funds.
This contrasts with North American worker-ownership plans
which emphasize, to some degree, individual ownership, either
through a share in the firm or through a claim to profits. North
American researchers have postulated that such individual claims are
necessary to realize the full benefits of self-management, particularly
the incentive for economic efficiency that is present in profit-sharing
schemes. This is significantly lacking in the Swedish system.
Individual influence and control are indirect, diffused through
representative systems within trade unions, wage-earner-fund boards
and government.
Finally, the lessons of the Swedish experience may prove to
be of only academic interest for advocates of worker-ownership in
Canada. The wage-earner fund proposal is arguably a reflection of
the unique Swedish situation, rather than a blueprint for other
industrial nations. Support for this argument can be found in the
extremely high unionization of the Swedish work force, which at 85
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percent is the highest in the world.105 This has resulted in cohesive
collective bargaining on a national basis with well-defined egalitarian
goals. As well, the Social Democrats have enjoyed a virtual
monopoly on elected power which has allowed a progressive
implementation of work democracy legislation. The wage-earner
funds reflect the "Social Democratic conception of the welfare state,
that distribution policy aims at the just and equitable distribution of
resources."106 Given this unique political culture, it is difficult to see
similar legislative schemes being implemented in Canada. But the
Swedish plan is nevertheless of use as yardstick for evaluating the
success of more decentralized plans in achieving the shared goals of
participation and equality.
V. EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS
Although the Esop form of worker ownership does not
attempt to establish a new form of property, it will be briefly
mentioned here. American attitudes to the concept have been
described by a proponent of the idea in the following terms.:
Worker capitalism ought to be accepted or rejected for what it is, and it is not
socialism.... Some people call it capitalism when managers exercise stock options
and take equity positions in the companies in which they are employed, yet they call
it socialism when workers do the same thing.107
ESOPs are clearly designed to stabilize capitalism by dispersing
stock ownership more widely through the economy. In fact, the
thousands of ESOPs established in the u.s. owe more to the
considerable tax and business incentives available under the plans
than to a desire to democratize the work place. A whole panoply
of legislation has been passed at the state and federal level in the
u.s. to encourage employee ownership plans. 08 The idea has the
Ahldn, supra, note 89 at 187.
106 Walters, supra, note 95 at 360.
107 J. O'Toole, 'The Uneven Road of Employee Ownership" (1979) Nov/Dec Harv. Bus,
Rev. 185 at 197.
108 T.J. Merker, "Working Toward Employee Ownership" (1984) 11 J. of Leg. 127 at
135-43 where the various laws supporting ESOPs are described.
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support of a broad range of American political opinion because it
represents a redistribution of ownership without a challenge to
private control of corporations. Leveraged plans allow corporations
to establish trust funds where stock is held on behalf of employees.
These trusts borrow money and purchase new stock issues from the
corporation to infuse new capital into the business. The tax effect
of these plans is that the corporation can deduct both interest and
capital costs of a loan, as they are considered part of the employee
benefit bill. 09
Experience under these plans has proved their proponents
right. No significant change in management practices or democratic
control of corporations generally takes place in an ESOP firm, even
when workers own over 50 percent of stock, although there are a
number of democratic ESoPs in which such changes have taken place.
Partial worker control, through methods such as worker directors,
access to corporate information, and stock positions have not been
sufficient to transform traditional capitalist enterprises. Bradley
examined such attempts in France, Canada and Britain and
concluded that limited methods such as these inevitably result in the
worker initiative collapsing under market pressures.110 ESOPs have
been used in the past as a weapon in concessionary bargaining with
unions, or to saddle workers with economically inefficient plants.111
Hammer and Stem, in a study of the Rath Packing ESOP, found that
traditional union-management conflict continued unabated in spite
of majority worker ownership and employee directors. Production
did not improve and the company was eventually closed. 12
The main theoretical objection to ESOPs is that they rely on
the medium of individual stock ownership with no other alterations
to the capitalist firm. As long as the firm survives, minority stock
109 J.E. Ronan, 'Tax Incentives Encouraging Use of Employee Stock Ownership Plans
as Corporate Finance and Anti-Takeover Devices" (1985) 58 Temple L.Q. 115 at 116.
110 K. Bradley, "A Comparative Analysis of Producer Co-operatives: Some Theoretical
and Empirical Implications" (1980) 18 Br. J. of Indus. Rels. 155 at 164.
111 D.G. Olson, "Union Experiences With Worker Ownership: Legal and Practical Issues
Raised by ESOPs, TRASOPs, Stock Purchases and Cooperatives" [1982] Wisc. L. Rev. 729.
112 T.H. Hammer and R.N. Stem, "A Yo-Yo Model of Cooperation" (1986) 39 Indus.
& Lab. Rels. Rev. 337 at 340.
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holders with a significant equity share will be able to exercise
disproportionate influence over the firm, just as they do in ordinary
capitalist firms. Differential ownership is virtually guaranteed in
such plans as stock is usually issued according to wage rate. Given
the great difference in salaries between senior management and
shop-floor workers in North America, the upper echelons of the
corporation will be able to control larger stock holdings, giving them
continued control of the corporation. Finally, the failure to create
a distinctive form of property that is insulated from the capitalist
economy leaves the Fsoe open to external takeover. Should stock
prices rise, there will be inevitable pressure on individual workers to
sell out and realize their capital gain. Once this occurs, the ESOP
reverts to a traditional capitalist structure.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
If worker ownership is to be encouraged and nurtured in
Canada, an appropriate legislative framework must be developed
under which worker co-operatives and other desirable forms of
worker ownership can be established. The present legislation in
Canada is unsatisfactory for this purpose. This article has presented
for consideration a number of options contained in models adopted
in other jurisdictions. Given the generally recognized advantages of
increased worker participation in ownership of work places and in
worker co-operatives in particular, it is past time for effective
legislation initiatives in this field. For example, as compared to
other forms of economic organization, worker co-operatives generate
greater efficiency and productivity, lower absentee rates and greater
job satisfaction on the part of workers, reduced need for managerial
supervision, and the lowest cost per job created, as well as
democratic control of the work place. Consequently, they are
deserving of considerable attention. The law's contribution to this
scenario would be an effective legislative framework. While this
would not, in itself, generate worker co-operatives and innovative
forms of worker ownership, it would be of considerable assistance.
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